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Abstract
We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each action
k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the action
whose mean payoff was highest during the testing phase. When k = 1, defection is
globally stable in the prisoner’s dilemma. By contrast, when k > 1 we show that, if
the gains from defection are not too large, there exists a globally stable state in which
agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stabil-
ity of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically
plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the case k = 1
commonly studied in the literature.
Keywords: learning, cooperation, best experienced payoff dynamics, sampling equi-
librium, evolutionary stability. JEL codes: C72, C73.
1. Introduction
The standard approach in game theory assumes that players form beliefs about the
various uncertainties they face and then best respond to these beliefs. In equilibrium, the
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beliefs will be correct and the players will play a Nash equilibrium. However, in some
economic environments where the players have limited information about the strategic
situation, Nash equilibrium prediction is hard to justify. Consider the following example
from Osborne and Rubinstein (1998). You are new to town and are planning your route
to work. How do you decide which road to take? You know that other people use the
roads, but have no idea which road is most congested. One plausible procedure is to try
each route several times and then permanently adopt the one that was (on average) best.
The outcome of this procedure is stochastic: you may sample the route that is in fact the
best on a day when a baseball game congests it. Once you select your route, you become
part of the environment that determines other drivers’ choices.
This procedure is formalized as follows. Consider agents in a large population who are
randomly matched to play a symmetric n-player game with a finite set of actions. Agents
occasionally revise their action (which can also be interpreted as agents occasionally
leaving the population and being replaced by new agents who base their behavior on the
sampling procedure, as in the motivating example above). Each revising agent samples
each feasible action k times and chooses the action that yields the highest average payoff
(applying some tie-breaking rule).
This procedure induces a dynamic process according to which the distribution of ac-
tions in the population evolves (best experienced payoff dynamics: Sethi, 2000; Sandholm
et al., 2019). An S(k) equilibrium α∗ is a rest point of the above dynamics. The equilibrium
is locally stable if any distribution of actions in the population that is sufficiently close
to α∗ converges to α∗, and globally stable if any distribution of actions in the population
with support that includes all actions converges to α∗.
The existing literature on payoff sampling equilibria (as surveyed below) has mainly
focused on S(1) equilibria, due to their tractability. It seems plausible that real-life behavior
would rely on sampling each action more than once. A key insight of our analysis is that
sampling actions several times might lead to qualitatively different results than sampling
each action only once. In particular, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, S(1) dynamics yield
the Nash equilibrium behavior, while S(k) dynamics (for k > 1) may induce substantial
cooperation.
Recall that each player in the prisoner’s dilemma game has two actions, cooperation c
and defection d, and the payoffs are as in Table 1, where g, l > 0. Sethi (2000) has shown
that defection is the unique S(1) globally stable equilibrium. By contrast, our first main
result (Theorem 1) shows that for any k ≥ 2, a game for which the gains from defection
are not too large (specifically, g, l < 1
k−1
) admits a globally stable state in which the rate of
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cooperation is between 28% and 50%.
c d
c 1 , 1 -l , 1+g
d 1+g , -l 0 , 0
Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma PayoffMatrix (g, l > 0)
Our remaining results characterize the local stability of strict equilibria for k ≥ 2.
Proposition 1 shows that defection in the prisoner’s dilemma game is locally stable iff
l > 1
k−1
. Theorem 2 extends the analysis to general symmetric games. It presents a simple
necessary and sufficient condition for a strict symmetric equilibrium action a∗ to be S(k)
locally stable (improving on the conditions presented in Sethi, 2000; Sandholm et al., 2020).
Roughly speaking, the condition is that in any set of actions A′ that does not include a∗
there is an action that never yields the highest payoff when the corresponding sample
includes a single occurrence of an action in A′ and all the other sampled actions are a∗.
Theorem 3 extends the characterization of local stability of strict equilibria to general
asymmetric games.
Outline: In the remaining parts of the Introduction we review the related literature,
and compare our predictions with the experimental findings. In Section 2, we introduce
our model and the solution concept. We analyze the prisoner’s dilemma in Section 3, and
characterize the stability of strict equilibria in general symmetric games in Section 4. An
extension of the analysis to asymmetric games is presented in Section 5.
1.1 Related Experimental Literature and Testable Predictions
The typical length of a lab experiment, as well as the subjects’ cognitive costs, are likely
to limit the sample sizes used by subjects to test the various actions to small values such as
k = 2 or k = 3 (because larger samples induce too-high costs of non-optimal play during
the sampling stage, and require larger cognitive effort to analyze). Proposition 2 shows
that for these small sample sizes of k = 2 or 3, the S(k) dynamics admit a unique globally
stable equilibrium, which depends on the parameter l. Specifically, everyone defecting is
the globally stable equilibrium if l > 1
k−1
, while there is a substantial rate of cooperation
between 24% and 33% if l < 1
k−1
.
The predictions of our model match quite well the empirical findings of the meta-
study of Mengel (2018) concerning the behavior of subjects playing the one-shot prisoner’s
dilemma. Mengel (2018, Tables A.3, B.5) summarizes 29 sessions of lab experiments of
that game in a “stranger” (one-shot) setting from 16 papers (with various values of g
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and l, both with median 1; the distribution of values is presented in Appendix B). The
average rate of cooperation in these experiments is 37%. Our predictions are also broadly
consistent with the experimentally observed comparative statics with respect to g and l,
which is that the rate of cooperation is decreasing in l but is independent of g (see Mengel,
2018, Table B.5, where l is called RISKNorm and g is called TEMPTNorm).1
The empirically observed average cooperation rate of 37% can also be explained by
other theories. Specifically, it can be explained by agents making errors when the payoff
differences are small (quantal response equilibrium, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), or by
agents caring about the payoffs of cooperative opponents (inequality aversion à la Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999, and reciprocity à la Rabin, 1993). Our model has two advantages in
comparison with these alternative models. First, our model is parameter free (for a fixed
k), while the existing models may require tuning their parameters to fit the experimental
data (such as the parameter describing the agents’ error rates in a quantal response
equilibrium).
Second, the predictions of the existing models are arguably less compatible with the
above-mentioned experimentally observed comparative statics. Quantal response equi-
librium predicts that the cooperation rate decreases in both parameters. The other models
predict that the cooperation rate decreases in g (because an increasing g increases the
material payoff from defecting, while it does not change the payoff of a cooperative op-
ponent), and their prediction with respect to l is ambiguous, because increasing l has two
opposing effects: increasing the material gain from defection against a defecting opponent
but decreasing the payoff of a cooperating opponent.
Our predictions might have an even better fit with experiments in which subjects have
only partial information about the payoffmatrix (a setting that might be relevant to many
real-life interactions), such as a “black box” setting in which players do not know the
game’s structure and observe only their realized payoffs (see, e.g., Nax and Perc, 2015;
Nax et al., 2016; Burton-Chellew et al., 2017).
1.2 Related Theoretical Literature
The payoff sampling dynamics approach employed in this paper was pioneered by
Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) and Sethi (2000). The approach has been used in a variety of
applications, including bounded-rationality models in industrial organization (Spiegler,
1Theorem 1 shows that for g that is not too large (specifically, g < 1k−1 ), the minimal rate of cooperation in
the globally stable state is 28% (when l < 1k−1 ). Proposition 2 allows arbitrary large g, which has the modest
impact of slightly decreasing the minimal globally stable rate of cooperation to 24%.
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2006a,b), coordination games (Ramsza, 2005), trust and delegation of control (Rowthorn
and Sethi, 2008), market entry (Chmura and Güth, 2011), ultimatum games (Miękisz and
Ramsza, 2013), common-pool resources (Cárdenas et al., 2015), contributions to public
goods (Mantilla et al., 2018), and finitely repeated games (Sethi, 2019).
Most of these papers mainly focus on S(1) dynamics, in which each action is only
sampled once.2 One exception is Sandholm et al. (2019), which analyzes the stable S(k)
equilibrium in a centipede game and shows that it involves cooperative behavior even
when the number of trials k of each action is large. Another is Sandholm et al. (2020),
which presents general stability and instability criteria of S(k) equilibria in general classes
of games, thus providing a unified way of deriving many of the specific results the above
papers derive, as well as several new results.
A related, alternative approach is action sampling dynamics (or sample best-response
dynamics), according to which each revising agent obtains a small random sample of
other players’ actions, and chooses the action that is a best reply to that sample (see, e.g.,
Sandholm, 2001; Kosfeld et al., 2002; Kreindler and Young, 2013; Oyama et al., 2015; Heller
and Mohlin, 2018; Salant and Cherry, 2020). The action sampling approach is a plausible
heuristic when the players know the payoff matrix and are capable of strategic thinking
but do not know the exact distribution of actions in the population.
2. Model
We consider a unit-mass continuum of agents who are randomly matched to play a
symmetric n-player game G = {A,u}, where A = {a1, a2, . . . , am} is the (finite) set of actions
and u : An → R is the payoff function, which is invariant to permutations of its second
through n-th arguments. An agent taking action a1 against opponents playing a2, . . . , an,
in any order, receives payoff u(a1, a2, . . . , an).
Aggregate behavior in the population is described by a population state α lying in the
unit simplex ∆ ≡ {α = (αai)
m
i=1
∈ Rm
+
|
∑m
i=1 αai = 1}, with αai representing the fraction of
agents in the population using action ai. The standard basis vector ea ∈ ∆ represents the
pure, or monomorphic, state in which all agents play action a. Where no confusion is
likely, we identify the action with the monomorphic state, denoting them both by a. The
set of interior population states, in which all actions are used by a positive mass of agents,
2 See also the variant of the S(1) dynamics presented in Rustichini (2003), according to which after an
initial phase of sampling each action once, each player in each round chooses the action that has yielded the
highest average payoff so far.
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is Int(∆) ≡ ∆ ∩Rm
++
.
A sampling procedure involves the testing of the different actions against randomly
drawn opponents, as explained next. Agents occasionally receive opportunities to switch
actions (equivalently, this can be thought of as agents dying and being replaced by new
agents). These opportunities do not depend on the currently used actions. That is, when
the population state is α(t), the proportion of agents originally using an action a out of the
agents who revise between time t and t + dt is equal to their proportion in the population
αa(t).
When an agent receives a revision opportunity, he tries each of the feasible actions k
times, using it each time against a newly drawn opponent from the population. Thus, the
probability that the opponent’s action is any a ∈ A is αa(t). The agent then chooses the
action that yielded the highest mean payoff in these trials, employing some tie-breaking
rule if more than one action yields the highest mean payoff. All of our results hold for any
tie-breaking rule. Denote the probability that the chosen action is a by wa,k(α(t)).
As a result of the revision procedure described above, the expected change in the
number of agents using an action a during an infinitesimal time interval of duration dt is
(2.1) wa,k(α(t))dt − αa(t)dt.
The first term in (2.1) is an inflow term, representing the expected number of revising
agents who switch to action a, while the second term is an outflow term, representing the
expected number of revising agents who are currently playing that action. In the limit
dt → 0, the rate of change of the fraction of agents using each action is given in vector
notation by
(2.2) α̇ = wk(α(t)) − α(t),
where wk is a vector whose a-th component is wa,k. The system of differential equations
(2.2) is called the k-payoff sampling dynamic. Its rest points are called S(k) equilibria.
Definition 1 (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1998). A population state α∗ ∈ ∆ is an S(k) equilib-
rium if wk(α∗) = α∗.
An equilibrium is (locally) asymptotically stable if a population beginning near it
remains close and eventually converges to the equilibrium, and it is (almost) globally
asymptotically stable if the population converges to it from any initial interior state.
Definition 2. An S(k) equilibrium α∗ is asymptotically stable if:
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1. (Lyapunov stability) for every neighborhood U of α∗ in ∆ there is a neighborhood
V ⊂ U of α∗ such that if α(0) ∈ V, then α(t) ∈ U for all t > 0; and
2. there is some neighborhood U of α∗ in ∆ such that all trajectories initially in U
converge to α∗; that is, α (0) ∈ U implies limt→∞ α (t) = α∗.
Definition 3. An S(k) equilibriumα∗ is globally asymptotically stable if all interior trajectories
converge to α∗; that is, α (0) ∈ Int(∆) implies limt→∞ α (t) = α∗.
3. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
This section focuses on the (two-player) prisoner’s dilemma game. The set of actions
is given by A = {c, d}, where c is interpreted as cooperation and d as defection. The payoffs
are as described in Table 1, with g, l > 0: when both players cooperate they get payoff 1,
when they both defect they get 0, and when one player defects and the other cooperates,
the defector gets 1+g and the cooperator gets −l.
3.1 Stability of Defection
Sethi (2000, Example 5) analyzes the S(1) dynamics and shows that everyone defecting
is globally stable.
Claim 1 (Sethi, 2000). Defection is S(1) globally asymptotically stable.
The argument behind Claim 1 is as follows. When an agent samples the action c
(henceforth, the c-sample) her payoff is higher than when sampling the action d (henceforth,
the d-sample) iff the opponent has cooperated in the c-sample and defected in the d-sample
(which happens with probability αc · αd). Therefore, the 1-payoff sampling dynamic is
given by
α̇c = wc,1(α) − αc = αc · αd − αc = αc(1 − αc) − αc = −α
2
c (< 0 if αc > 0).
The unique rest point α∗c = 0 is the unique S(1) equilibrium, and it is easy to see that it is
globally asymptotically stable.
Our next result shows that for k ≥ 2 everyone defecting is no longer globally asymp-
totically stable (indeed, it is not even locally asymptotically stable) if l < 1
k−1
.
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Proposition 1. Let k ≥ 2 and assume that3 l , 1
k−1
. Defection is S(k) asymptotically stable if and
only if l > 1
k−1
.
Proposition 1 is implied by the results of Sandholm et al. (2020), and as we show in
Section 4.3, it also follows from Theorem 2 below. For completeness, we provide a direct
sketch of proof.
Sketch of Proof. Consider a population state in which a small fraction ǫ of the agents co-
operate and the remaining 1 − ǫ agents defect. A revising agent most likely sees all the
opponents defecting, both in the c-sample and in the d-sample. With a probability of
approximately kǫ, the agent sees a single cooperation in the c-sample and no cooperation
in the d-sample, and so c yields a mean payoff of 1−(k−1)·l
k
and d yields 0. The former is
higher iff l < 1
k−1
. Thus, if the last inequality holds, then the prevalence of cooperation
gradually increases, and the population drifts away from the state where everyone de-
fects. By contrast, if l > 1
k−1
, then cooperation yields the higher mean payoff only if the
c-sample includes at least two cooperators, which happens with a negligible probability
of order ǫ2. Therefore, in this case, cooperation gradually dies out, and the population
converges to the state where everyone defects. 
3.2 Stability of (Partial) Cooperation
Next we show that for any k ≥ 2, if g and l are sufficiently small, then the prisoner’s
dilemma game admits a globally asymptotically stable S(k) equilibrium in which the
frequency of cooperation is between 28% and 50% and is increasing in k.
Theorem 1. For k ≥ 2 and g, l < 1
k−1
, the unique S(k) globally asymptotically stable equilibrium
αk in the prisoner’s dilemma game satisfies 0.28 < αkc < 0.5. Moreover, α
k′
c < α
k
c for all 2 ≤ k
′ < k.
The intuition for Theorem 1 is as follows. The condition g, l < 1
k−1
implies that cooper-
ation yields a higher average payoff than defection iff the opponent has cooperated more
times in the d-sample than in the c-sample. If αc is close to zero, then the probability of
this event is roughly k · αc > αc. The symmetry between the two samples implies that
the probability that the opponent has cooperated more times in the d-sample is less than
0.5. Thus, there exists αkc < 0.5, which is not close to zero, for which the probability of
3The stability of defection in the borderline case of l = 1k−1 depends on the tie-breaking rule, because
observing a single c in the c-sample and no c’s in the d-sample produces a tie between the two samples. If
one assumes a uniform tie-breaking rule, then action c wins with a probability of k2ǫ−O(ǫ
2), which is greater
than ǫ if and only if k > 2. Thus, with this rule, defection is stable if k = 2 and unstable if k > 2.
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cooperation yielding a higher average payoff is equal to αkc. The proof shows that this
equality holds for αkc > 0.28, and that αc is globally stable.
Proof. The proof of the theorem uses a number of claims, whose formal proofs are given
in Appendix A. In what follows, we state each claim and present a sketch of proof.
Notation For j ≤ k, let fk,p( j) ≡
(k
j
)
p j(1−p)k− j be the probability mass function of a binomial
random variable with parameters k and p. Let Tie(k, p) =
∑k
j=0( fk,p( j))
2 be the probability of
having a tie between two independent binomial random variables with parameters k, p,
and let Win(k, p) = 0.5 · (1 − Tie(k, p)) be the probability that the first random variable has
a larger value than the second. Let p ≡ αc denote the proportion of cooperating agents in
the population.
Claim 2. Assume that g, l ∈ (0, 1
k−1
). The k-payoff sampling dynamic is given by
(3.1) ṗ =Win(k, p) − p.
Sketch of Proof. The condition g, l < 1
k−1
implies that action c has a higher mean payoff iff
the c-sample includes more cooperating opponents than the d-sample does. The number
of cooperators in each sample has a binomial distribution with parameters k and p, and
so the probability of c having a higher mean payoff is Win(k, p) (which we substitute in
(2.2)). 
For k ≥ 2 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, denote the expression on the right-hand side of Eq. (3.1) by
(3.2) hk(p) =Win(k, p) − p.
Claim 3. For k ≥ 2, the function hk satisfies hk(0) = 0, hk(1) = −1 and h′k(0) > 0.
Sketch of Proof. When p = 0 (resp., = 1), in both samples all the opponents are defectors
(resp., cooperators). The conclusion implies that Win(k, p) = 0 for p ∈ {0, 1}, which, in turn,
implies that hk(0) = 0 and hk(1) = −1. Next, observe that for p = ǫ << 1, Win(k, p) ≈ kǫ,
which is approximately the probability of having at least one cooperator in the c-sample.
Thus, hk(ǫ) ≈ kǫ − ǫ, which implies that h′k(0) = k − 1 > 0.

Claim 4. For k ≥ 2, the expression hk(p) is concave in p, and satisfies hk(p) < hk+1(p) for p ∈ (0, 1),
hk
(
1
2
)
< 0, and limk→∞ hk
(
1
2
)
= 0.
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Sketch of Proof. Observe that Tie(k, p) is close to 1 when p is close to either zero or one, and
is smaller for intermediate p’s. The formal proof shows (by analyzing the characteristic
function) that Tie(k, p) is (1) convex in p, (2) decreasing in k (i.e., the larger the number of
actions in each sample, the smaller the probability of having exactly the same number of
cooperators in both samples), and (3) converges to zero as k tends to ∞. These findings
imply that hk(p) = (0.5 · (1 − Tie(k, p)) − p is concave in p and increasing in k, and that
hk
(
1
2
)
=
1
2
·
(
1 − Tie
(
k,
1
2
))
−
1
2
<
1
2
−
1
2
= 0, and
lim
k→∞
hk
(
1
2
)
= lim
k→∞
(
1
2
·
(
1 − Tie
(
k,
1
2
))
−
1
2
)
=
(
1
2
− 0
)
−
1
2
= 0.

It follows from Claims 3 and 4 that for k ≥ 2 the equation hk(p) = 0 has a unique solution
in the interval (0, 1), that this solution p(k) corresponds to an S(k) globally asymptotically
stable state, that it satisfies p(k) < 0.5, and that it is increasing in k.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, it remains to show that p(2) > 0.28. This inequality
is an immediate corollary of the fact that for p = 0.28,
h2(p = 0.28) = 2p(1 − p)
3
+ p2(1 − p2) − p ≈ 0.001 > 0. 
Figure 1 shows the S(k) payoff sampling dynamics and the S(k) globally stable equilibria
for various values of k.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
p
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.2
0.4
hk(p)
k=100 (p(100) = 47.2%; g, l < 1/99)
k=10 (p(10) = 41.0%; g, l < 1/9)
k=3 (p(3) = 33.2%; g, l < 1/2)
k=2 (p(2) = 28.2%; g, l < 1)
k=1 (p(1) = 0%; g, l < ∞)
Figure 1: The function hk and its zero p(k) for various values of k.
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Remark 1. Theorem 1 shows that partial cooperation is globally stable for any fixed k if
the parameters g and l are sufficiently small (with the upper bound depending on k). At
the same time, it is well known that, for fixed g and l, defection is globally stable if k is
sufficiently large (Sandholm et al., 2020, Prop. 4.3; see also Osborne and Rubinstein, 1998,
Prop. 4).
Theorem 1 leaves open the question of the stability of partial cooperation when either
g or l is larger than 1
k−1
. The next proposition answers this question for small sample sizes
of k = 2 or 3, leaving full characterization of larger sample sizes for future research. As the
proposition states, everyone defecting is globally asymptotically stable if l > 1
k−1
, while if
the reverse inequality holds, the globally asymptotically stable state has a substantial rate
of cooperation of between 24% and 33%.
Proposition 2. For k ∈ {2, 3}, the unique S(k) globally asymptotically stable equilibrium αk
satisfies αkc = 0 if l >
1
k−1
, and αkc ∈ (0.24, 0.33) if l <
1
k−1
.
The proof of the proposition is presented in Appendix A.6.
4. General Symmetric Games
In this section we extend Proposition 1 by presenting a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for S(k) asymptotic stability of actions in general symmetric games. Our character-
ization uses the following two definitions.
4.1 Definitions
Definition 4. A symmetric n-player game with payoff function u : An → R is generic if for any
two sequences of action profiles
((
a1
j
, a2
j
, . . . , an
j
))L
j=1
and
((
ã1
j
, ã2
j
, . . . , ãn
j
))L
j=1
of equal length L, the
equality
L∑
j=1
u
(
a1j , a
2
j , . . . , a
n
j
)
=
L∑
j=1
u
(
ã1j , ã
2
j , . . . , ã
n
j
)
implies
{
a1
j
}L
j=1
=
{
ã1
j
}L
j=1
.
Thus, a symmetric game is generic if the sums of payoffs of two sequences of action
profiles are equal only if every action that appears as the first action in one of the profiles
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in one sequence also appears as the first action in the other sequence. Note that this
definition of genericity is rather weak. A stronger definition could be used instead; the
use of a weak definition only strengthens our results below. Observe also that if each entry
in the payoff matrix is independently drawn from a continuous (atomless) distribution,
then the resulting random symmetric game is generic with probability one. Clearly, in a
generic game, every pure Nash equilibrium is a strict equilibrium.
Definition 5. For an action a∗ in a symmetric n-player game, and for a, a′ ∈ A\ {a∗}:
1. action a directly S(k) supports a′ against a∗ if
u(a′, a, a∗, . . . , a∗) + (k − 1) · u(a′, a∗, . . . , a∗) > k · u(a∗, . . . , a∗); and
2. action a S(k) supports a′ by spoiling a∗ if
k · u(a′, a∗, . . . , a∗) > u(a∗, a, a∗, . . . , a∗) + (k − 1) · u(a∗, . . . , a∗)
and u(a′, a∗, . . . , a∗) > u(b, a∗, . . . , a∗) ∀b < {a∗, a′}.
Action a S(k) single supports, double supports, or just supports action a′ against a∗ if exactly
one of conditions 1 and 2, both conditions, or at least one condition, respectively, holds.
The notion of weak S(k) support and the related terms (weak direct support, weak support
by spoiling, weak single support, and weak double support) are defined similarly, except
that the strict inequalities in 1 and 2 are replaced by weak inequalities.
Less formally, action a supports action a′ against action a∗ if a single appearance of
a in a population in which almost everyone plays a∗ can make the mean payoff in the
a′-sample the highest one. For an action a that directly supports a′ (a supporter of a′, in the
terminology of Sandholm et al., 2020, p.12), a single appearance of a in the a′-sample (with
all other actions being a∗) is sufficient to make the mean payoff larger than that yielded by
a∗, and thus to make it the largest payoff. For a that supports a′ by spoiling a∗ (a benefiting
spoiler of a∗, in that terminology), a single appearance of a in the a∗-sample is sufficient
to make the mean payoff smaller than that yielded by a′. This makes the latter the largest
mean payoff if a′ is the second-best reply to a∗ (while if another action a′′ is second best,
then a′′ yields a higher payoff, assuming that the a′′-sample includes only a∗’s). Note that,
in a generic game, the second-best reply is unique: the set argmaxb,a∗ u(b, a
∗, . . . , a∗) is a
singleton.
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Also, in a generic game, the notions of support and weak support coincide: action a
S(k) supports a′ against a∗ if and only if it weakly S(k) supports a′ against a∗.
Observe that if a∗ is a symmetric equilibrium action, then S(k) support against it is
“easier" the smaller k is: if action a (weakly) S(k) supports a′ against a∗, then it (respectively,
weakly) S(k′) supports a′ against a∗ for all k′ < k.
4.2 Result
It is well known (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1998) that an action a∗ can be an S(k)
equilibrium only if a∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium (otherwise, wa∗,k(ea∗) = 0, which
contradicts ea∗ being a rest point). Moreover, if the tie-breaking rule assigns positive
probability to all co-winning actions, then a∗ must be a strict equilibrium (otherwise,
wa∗,k(ea∗) < 1, which again contradicts ea∗ being a rest point). Thus, being a strict symmetric
equilibrium is essentially a necessary condition for an action to be S(k) asymptotically
stable. Our next result characterizes the conditions for a strict symmetric equilibrium
action to be S(k) asymptotically stable when k ≥ 2 or n ≥ 3.
Theorem 2. Suppose that k ≥ 2 or n ≥ 3. A necessary and sufficient condition for a strict
symmetric equilibrium action a∗ in a generic symmetric n-player game to be S(k) asymptotically
stable is that, for the set A∗ ≡ A\{a∗},
I. every nonempty subset A′ ⊆ A∗ includes an action a′ that is not S(k) supported against a∗
by any action in A′.
In a non-generic game, condition I is still necessary for S(k) asymptotic stability, and a sufficient
condition is
II. every nonempty subset A′ ⊆ A∗ includes an action a′ that is not weakly S(k) supported
against a∗ by any action in A′.
In conditions I and II, “is not S(k) supported by” and “is not weakly S(k) supported by” can
be replaced by “does not S(k) support” and “does not weakly S(k) support”, respectively, as the
conditions resulting from these replacements, I’ and II’, are equivalent to I and II.
Sketch of Proof. Suppose that there is a nonempty subset of actions A′ ⊆ A∗, with cardinal-
ity m ≥ 1, such that each action a′ ∈ A′ is supported by some action in A′. Consider an
initial population state α in which a fraction 1− ǫ of the agents play a∗ and ǫ
m
play each of
the actions in A′. Since each a′ ∈ A′ is supported by some action a in A′, there is a proba-
bility of approximately k(n−1) ǫ
m
of having action a appear in the sample and thus making
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the mean payoff yielded by a′ the highest one. It follows that wa′,k(α) = k(n− 1)
ǫ
m
> ǫ
m
= αa′
for all a′ ∈ A′. Thus the frequency of all actions in A′ increases, which implies that a∗
is not asymptotically stable. The formal proof (Appendix A.4) formalizes this intuition,
by examining the Jacobian matrix at ea∗ and showing that it admits an eigenvalue greater
than 1.
Next, suppose that every nonempty subset A′ ⊆ A∗ includes an action a′ that is not
weakly S(k) supported by any action in A′. Consider a state in which 1 − ǫ of the agents
play a∗. We know that there exists an action a′ that is not weakly S(k) supported by any
action in A∗. This implies that the probability of action a′ having the maximal mean payoff
in an agent’s sample is O(ǫ2), and, thus, wa′,k(α) = O(ǫ2). As the frequency of a′ becomes
negligible, we can iterate the argument for A′ = A∗\{a′}, and find another action a′′ for
which wa′′,k(α) = O(ǫ2), etc. The formal proof (Appendix A.4) shows that (a) condition II
implies that all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are negative, and (b) the phrase “is
not weakly S(k) supported by” can be replaced by “does not weakly S(k) support.” 
We remark that condition II is sufficient for asymptotic stability also when k = 1 and
n = 2. However, condition I is not necessary in this case, as demonstrated by defection in
the prisoner’s dilemma.
The following corollary shows that any strict symmetric equilibrium is characterized
by a threshold k0 < ∞ that determines the equilibrium’s asymptotic stability for any k ≥ 2.
(Note that the corollary does not give any information regarding S(1) stability.)
Corollary 1. Let a∗ be a strict symmetric equilibrium action in a symmetric game. There exists
an integer k0 such that, for k ≥ 2, action a
∗ is S(k) asymptotically stable iff k ≥ k0.
Proof. Let k̄ ≥ 2 be a sufficiently large integer such that, for any action a′ , a∗ and action
profiles (a1, ..., an) and (a′1, ..., a′n),
k̄ ·
(
u(a∗, ..., a∗) − u(a′, a∗, ..., a∗)
)
> u(a1, ..., an) − u(a′1, ..., a′n).
The inequality implies that there exists no pair of actions a, a′ , a∗ such that action a
weakly supports action a′ against a∗, which in view of Theorem 2 implies that a∗ is an S(k̄)
asymptotically stable equilibrium. Let k0 be the smallest number for which a
∗ is an S(k0)
asymptotically stable equilibrium. This implies that there is no pair of actions a, a′ , a∗
such that action a S(k0) supports a
′ against a∗. The last observation at the end of Section
4.1 implies that for any k > k0 there is no pair of actions a, a′ , a∗ such that action a S(k)
supports a′ against a∗, which implies that, for k ≥ 2, action a∗ is an S(k) asymptotically
stable equilibrium iff k ≥ k0. 
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4.3 Applications
In this subsection we demonstrate the usefulness of the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions identified in Theorem 2 by studying the S(k) asymptotic stability of strict equilibria
in a number of applications.
The first two applications deal with two-action games (A = {a∗, a′}). Observe that in
such games condition I (resp., I’) in Theorem 2 reduces to the requirement that the other
action a′ does not S(k) (resp., weakly) support itself against a∗.
Prisoner’s dilemma Cooperation cannot support itself by spoiling, because it always
increases the payoff of a defecting opponent. For k ≥ 2, cooperation directly (resp.,
weakly) S(k) supports itself against defection iff l < 1
k−1
(resp., ≤ 1
k−1
), because
u(c, c) + (k − 1) · u(c, d) > k · u(d, d)⇔ 1 + (k − 1) · (−l) > 0 ⇔ l <
1
k − 1
.
By Theorem 2, the last finding implies that defection is asymptotically stable if l > 1
k−1
and
is not asymptotically stable if l < 1
k−1
, which proves Proposition 1.
Public good games Consider a symmetric n-player game, with n ≥ 2, where the set
of actions is A = {c,nc}, with c and nc interpreted as contributing or not contributing,
respectively, a fixed amount of some private good. The amount of public good produced
is ϕ(l), where l is the number of contributions and ϕ is a nondecreasing production
function with ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) < 1. Each of the contributors gets a payoff of ϕ(l) − 1,
while for a non-contributor the payoff isϕ(l). The assumptionϕ(1) < 1 implies that no one
contributing is a strict equilibrium (and it is the unique equilibrium if ϕ(l + 1) − ϕ(l) < 1
for all l). Observe that contributing cannot support itself by spoiling, and it directly S(k)
supports itself against non-contributing iff
u(c, c,nc, ...,nc) + (k − 1) · u(c,nc, ...,nc) > k · u(nc, ...,nc)⇔
ϕ(2) − 1 + (k − 1) · (ϕ(1) − 1) > 0⇔ k < 1 −
1 − ϕ(2)
1 − ϕ(1)
.
By Theorem 2, the above finding implies that if n ≥ 3 or k ≥ 2, then a sufficient condition
for not contributing to be S(k) asymptotically stable is that
k > 1 −
1 − ϕ(2)
1 − ϕ(1)
.
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The corresponding weak inequality is a necessary condition.
Coordination games Consider a symmetric n-player game, with n ≥ 2, where the set of
actions is A = {a1, ..., am}, with m ≥ 2. If all players choose the same action a j, everyone
gets payoff u j, where u1 ≥ u2 ≥ ... ≥ um > 0. If all players do not choose the same
action, then everyone gets zero. The game admits m strict equilibria: everyone playing
a1, everyone playing a2, ..., everyone playing am. Next we characterize the stability of the
strict symmetric equilibrium action al, for any 1 ≤ m. No action ai , al S(k) supports an
action a j , al against al by spoiling, because
u(a j, al, ..., al) = 0 < u(al, ai, al, .., al) + (k − 1) · u(al, ..., al) = (k − 1) · ul.
The only action that might directly S(k) support a j , al against al is a j itself, and this can
happen only if n = 2. This is so because if ai , a j or n > 2, then the following inequality
holds:
u(a j, ai, al, ..., al) + (k − 1) · u(a j, al, ..., al) = 0 < k · u(al, ..., al) = k · ul.
If n = 2, then a j directly supports itself against al iff
u(a j, a j) + (k − 1) · u(a j, al) > k · u(al, al)⇔ u j + 0 > k · ul.
By Theorem 2, this implies that all the strict equilibria are S(k) asymptotically stable for
any k if there are at least three players. In the two-player case, and for k ≥ 2, the strict
symmetric equilibrium action al is S(k) asymptotically stable if ul >
u1
k
and it is not S(k)
asymptotically stable if ul <
u1
k
.
4.4 Comparison with Sandholm et al. (2020)
We conclude this section by comparing Theorem 2 with the conditions for stability of
strict equilibria presented in Sandholm et al. (2020, Section 5) (which, in turn, improve
on the conditions presented in Sethi, 2000). For simplicity, the comparison focuses on the
case of generic symmetric games.4 As in Theorem 2, we use the notation A∗ ≡ A\{a∗}.
Sandholm et al. (2020) identify two necessary conditions for stability of a strict equi-
librium. They are the negations of conditions 1 and 2 in the following proposition.
4 In addition, our setting concerns only revising agents who test all feasible actions. The more general
setting studied by Sandholm et al. allows dynamics in which revising agents test only some of the actions.
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Adaptation of Proposition 5.4 (Sandholm et al., 2020) Let a∗ be a strict symmetric equi-
librium action in a generic symmetric game. For k ≥ 2, action a∗ is not S(k) asymptotically
stable if either:
1. ∃A′ ⊆ A∗ such that every a′ ∈ A′ is directly supported by some action in A′; or
2. ∃A′ ⊆ A∗ such that every action a′ ∈ A′ supports some action in A′.
Theorem 2 strengthens this result by omitting “directly” from condition 1, thus weakening
the condition. Moreover, it shows that this weaker condition (call it 1’) is actually equiva-
lent to condition 2, and that both 1’ and 2 are in fact necessary and sufficient conditions for
asymptotic stability.
Sandholm et al. (2020) present the following sufficient condition for stability.
Definition 6. Action a tentatively S(k) supports action a′ by spoiling a∗ if
k · u(a′, a∗, . . . , a∗) > u(a∗, a, a∗, . . . , a∗) + (k − 1) · u(a∗, . . . , a∗).
Adaptation of Prop. 5.9 (Sandholm et al., 2020) Let a∗ be a strict symmetric equilibrium
action in a generic symmetric game. For k ≥ 2, action a∗ is S(k) asymptotically stable if
3. there exists an ordering of A∗ such that no action a in this set directly S(k) supports
or tentatively S(k) supports by spoiling a∗ any weakly higher action a′.
Theorem 2 strengthens this result by omitting “tentatively” from condition 3, thus
weakening the condition and making it necessary and sufficient for stability.5 Sufficiency
still holds because the weaker condition (call it 3’) implies that the lowest action in every
subset A′ ⊆ A∗ does not S(k) support any action in A′. Necessity holds because it is not
very difficult to see that 3’ is implied by condition I in Theorem 2. (Order A∗ by recursively
removing an element that is not S(k) supported against a∗ by any of the current elements.)
5. Asymmetric Games
In what follows we adapt our model and the characterization of S(k) asymptotic sta-
bility to asymmetric games.
5 Condition 3 is not necessary for asymptotic stability. In the symmetric two-player game defined by the
following payoffmatrix, action a∗ is S(2) asymptotically stable as it satisfies the condition in Theorem 2, yet
it does not satisfy condition 3 due to action a′′ tentatively supporting itself by spoiling.
a∗ 8 9 3
a’ 7 5 2
a′′ 6 4 1
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Each player i has a finite set of actions Ai and a payoff function ui :
∏n
j=1 A j → R.
The player is represented by a distinct population of agents, the i-population, whose state
αi is an element of the unit simplex in R|Ai|. The state of all n populations is given by
α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) ∈ ∆, where ∆ is the Cartesian product of the players’ unit simplices.
The population state α determines for each player i the probability vector wi
k
(α(t))
specifying the probability that each of the player’s actions yields the highest mean payoff
in k trials, employing some tie-breaking rule. For any k ≥ 1, the k-payoff sampling dynamic
is given by
(5.1) α̇i = wik(α(t)) − α
i(t).
A population state α∗ is an S(k) equilibrium if wi
k
(α∗) = (α∗)i for each player i. Asymptotic
stability and global asymptotic stability are defined as in the symmetric case.
The notion of supporting an action against an action profile a∗ = (a∗
1
, a∗2 , . . . , a
∗
n) is
conceptually similar to that in symmetric games. To present it in a formally similar way,
consider the disjoint union A∗ = ˙
⋃n
i=1(Ai\{a
∗
i
}). Each element of A∗ is of the form ai: a
specific action of a specified player i such that ai , a
∗
i
. For such an element, (ai, a∗−i) denotes
the action profile in which player i plays ai and all the other players play according to a
∗.
For ai, a j ∈ A∗ with i , j, (ai, a j, a∗−i j) denotes the action profile in which player i plays ai,
player j plays a j, and all the other players play according to a
∗.
Definition 7. For an action profile a∗ in an n-player game, and for ai, a j ∈ A∗:
1. action ai directly S(k) supports a j against a
∗ if i , j and
u j(ai, a j, a
∗
−i j) + (k − 1) · u j(a j, a
∗
− j) > k · u j(a
∗); and
2. action ai S(k) supports a j by spoiling a
∗ if i , j and
k · u j(a j, a
∗
− j) > u j(ai, a
∗
−i) + (k − 1) · u j(a
∗) and u j(a j, a
∗
− j) > u j(b j, a
∗
− j) ∀b j , a j ∈ A
∗.
Action ai S(k) single supports, double supports, or just supports action a j against a
∗ if exactly
one of conditions 1 and 2, both conditions, or at least one condition, respectively, holds.
Weak S(k) support, and the related terms, are defined similarly, except that the strict
inequalities in 1 and 2 are replaced by weak inequalities.
Next we adapt the characterization of S(k) asymptotic stability to asymmetric games.
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Theorem 3. For k ≥ 2, a necessary condition for a strict equilibrium a∗ in an n-player game to be
S(k) asymptotically stable is that condition I (equivalently, I’) in Theorem 2 holds, and a sufficient
condition is that II (equivalently, II’) holds.
Obviously, the necessary conditions coincide with the sufficient ones if the game is
generic, in the standard sense. The proof of the theorem, which is very similar to that of
Theorem 2, is presented in Appendix A.5.
When the underlying game is symmetric, there are two different best experienced
payoff dynamics that are applicable to it. The baseline, one-population dynamics presented
in Section 2 (specifically, (2.2)) assumes a single population from which the players are
sampled. Moreover, players are not assigned roles in the game; there is no player 1, player
2, etc. An alternative dynamics that can be applied to the game are the n-population dy-
namics 5.1. Although meant for asymmetric games, they can be used to study symmetric
games in which the players are arbitrarily numbered, with the i-population representing
player6 i.
In other evolutionary dynamics it is often the case that stability under the one-
population dynamics is not equivalent to stability under the n-population dynamics.
(For example, it is well known that the mixed equilibrium of a hawk-dove game is stable
under the one-population replicator dynamics but is not stable under the two-population
replicator dynamics.) Our next result shows that this is not the case here.
Corollary 2. For k ≥ 2, a strict symmetric equilibrium action a∗ in a symmetric n-player game is
S(k) asymptotically stable under the one-population dynamics (2.2) if and only if everyone playing
a∗ is S(k) asymptotically stable under the n-population dynamics (5.1).
The simple proof, which is given in Appendix A.7, relies on the fact that our two
definitions of an action supporting another action against a strict symmetric equilibrium
(action) essentially coincide when the underlying game is symmetric.
5.1 Applications
We conclude this section with demonstrating the usefulness of Theorem 3 by applying
it to the study of S(k) asymptotic stability of strict equilibria in asymmetric prisoner’s
dilemma and hawk-dove games.
6The n-population dynamics can also capture environments in which players from a single population
play in all roles, the roles are observable, and a player conditions her action on her role.
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Asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma
c2 d2
c1 1 , 1 -l1 , 1+g2
d1 1+g1 , -l2 0 , 0
Asymmetric Hawk-Dove
D2 H2
D1 1 , 1 l1 , 1+g2
H1 1+g1 , l2 0 , 0
Table 2: PayoffMatrices of Asymmetric Games (g1, g2, l1, l2 > 0; in hawk-dove, also l1, l2 < 1)
Asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma The left-hand side of Table 2 presents the payoffmatrix
of an asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma, in which the unique equilibrium is d = (d1, d2),
mutual defection. Action c1 cannot support c2 by spoiling, because cooperation increases
the payoff of a defecting opponent. It directly (weakly) supports c2 against d iff l2 <
1
k−1
(respectively, ≤ 1
k−1
), because
u2(c1, c2) + (k − 1) · u2(d1, c2) > k · u2(d)⇔ 1 + (k − 1) · (−l2) > 0.
The same holds with 1 and 2 interchanged. This implies, by Theorem 3, that for any
k ≥ 2 mutual defection is S(k) asymptotically stable if max(l1, l2) >
1
k−1
and is not S(k)
asymptotically stable if max(l1, l2) <
1
k−1
. Note that, if l1 = l2, then in accordance with
Corollary 2 the condition for stability coincides with that of the one-population model in
the symmetric prisoner’s dilemma.
Asymmetric hawk-dove The right-hand side of Table 2 presents the payoff matrix of
the asymmetric hawk-dove game. The game admits two strict equilibria, (D1,H2) and
(H1,D2), in which one player plays hawk and the other plays dove. Observe that action
D2 can S(k) support action H1 against (D1,H2) only by direct support, which is obtained iff
u1 (H1,D2) + (k − 1) · u1 (H1,H2) > k · u1 (D1,H2) ⇔ 1 + g1 > k · l1.
Action H1 can S(k) support action D2 against (D1,H2) only by spoiling, which is obtained
iff
k·u2 (D1,D2) > u2 (H1,H2)+(k − 1)·u2 (D1,H2) ⇔ k > (k − 1)·
(
1 + g2
)
⇔ g2 <
1
k − 1
.
By Theorem 3, this implies that (D1,H2) is asymptotically stable if g1 < k · l1 − 1 or g2 >
1
k−1
and is not asymptotically stable if g1 > k · l1−1 and g2 <
1
k−1
. The conditions for asymptotic
stability of the other strict equilibrium are obtained by interchanging 1 and 2.
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Appendix
A. Proofs
A.1 Proof of Claim 2
Recall that p ≡ αc and 1 − p ≡ αd denote the proportion of agents in the population
playing actions c and d, respectively. An agent’s c-sample includes k actions of the
opponents. If j ∈ {0, ..., k} of these are c, then the agent’s mean payoff (when playing c) is
j − (k − j)l. Similarly, if j′ ∈ {0, ..., k} of the sampled actions in the agent’s d-sample are c,
then the mean payoff (when playing action d) is j′(1 + g). The difference between the two
payoffs is
( j − (k − j)l) − j′(1 + g) = j − j′ − ((k − j)l + j′g).
This expression is clearly negative if j ≤ j′. If j ≥ j′ + 1, it is positive, since (k − j)l + j′g ≤
k− j+ j′
k−1
≤ 1 and the first inequality becomes an equality only if j = k and j′ = 0 while the
second one does so only if j = j′ + 1.
These conclusions prove that the c-sample yields a superior payoff iff it includes more
cooperations than the d-sample does. As the number of cooperators in each sample has a
binomial distribution with parameters k and p, we conclude that wc,k =Win(k, p).
A.2 Proof of Claim 3
A binomial random variable with parameters k, p has a degenerate distribution if
p ∈ {0, 1}, and so Win(k, 0) = Win(k, 1) = 0. From Eq. (3.2) we get hk(0) = 0 − 0 = 0, hk(1) =
0 − 1 = −1. To show that h′
k
(0) > 0 for k = 2, 3, 4, . . . , we use the fact that
hk(p) =Win(k, p) − p = 0.5(1 − Tie(k, p)) − p = 0.5(1 −
k∑
j=0
( fk,p( j))
2) − p)
= 0.5(1 − ((1 − p)2k +O(p2)) − p (O(p2) denotes the terms with degree ≥ 2)
= 0.5(1 − (1 − 2pk +O(p2)) − p +O(p2) = kp − p +O(p2) = (k − 1)p +O(p2).
From the above expression, it follows that h′
k
(0) = k − 1 > 0 for k > 1.
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A.3 Proof of Claim 4
Let {A j,p}
k
j=1
, {B j,p}kj=1 be 2k independent Bernoulli random variables with parameter
p. Then Xk,p =
∑k
i=1 A j,p and Yk,p =
∑k
j=1 B j,p are i.i.d. binomial random variables with
parameters k and p. Eq. (3.2) can be expressed as
hk(p) = P(Xk,p > Yk,p) − p
=
1
2
(
P(Xk,p > Yk,p) + P(Xk,p < Yk,p)
)
− p (since Xk,p and Yk,p are i.i.d.)
=
1
2
(
1 − P(Xk,p = Yk,p)
)
− p.(A.1)
For j = 1, 2, . . . , k, let Z j,p = A j,p − B j,p. Clearly, {Z j,p}nj=1 are i.i.d., with distribution given by
P(Z j,p = −1) = P(Z j,p = 1) = pq and P(Z j,p = 0) = 1 − 2pq,
where q = 1 − p.
Consider the characteristic function ϕk(·; p) of the random variable Zkp = Xk,p − Yk,p =
∑k
j=1 Z j,p :
ϕk(t; p) = E
[
eitZ
k
p
]
= E
[
eit
∑k
j=1 Z j,p
]
=
(
E[eitZ1,p]
)k
=
(
eit(−1)pq + eit(1)pq + eit(0)(1 − 2pq)
)k
=
(
1 + pq(e−it + eit − 2)
)k
=
(
1 + 2pq(cos (t) − 1)
)k
(since e−it + eit = 2cos (t))
=
(
1 − 4p(1 − p)sin2
(
t
2
))k (
since q = 1 − p and cos (t) = 1 − 2sin2
(
t
2
))
.
The base of the last exponent, with power k, is an expression that is convex as a function
of p, lies between 0 and 1 and, if 0 < p < 1 and t is not a whole multiple of π, is different
from 0 and 1. Therefore, the same is true for ϕk(t; p) and, if 0 < p < 1 and t is not a whole
multiple of π, ϕk(t; p) > ϕk+1(t; p) and limk→∞ ϕk(t; p) = 0. It follows, in view of Eq. (A.1)
and the fact that (see Fact 1)
P(Xk,p = Yk,p) = P(Z
k
p = 0) =
1
2π
∫ π
−π
ϕk(t; p)dt,
that the function hk is concave and, for 0 < p < 1, the sequence
(
hk(p)
)∞
k=1 is strictly
increasing and converges to 1
2
− p. This completes the proof.
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Fact 1. P(Zkp = 0) =
1
2π
∫ π
−π
ϕk(t; p)dt.
Proof of Fact 1. From the definition of ϕk(t; p),we have the following:
∫ π
−π
ϕk(t; p)dt =
∫ π
−π
E
[
eitZ
k
p
]
dt = E
[∫ π
−π
eitZ
k
pdt
]
= E
[∫ π
−π
eitZ
k
p
(
1{Zkp=0}
+ 1{Zkp,0}
)
dt
]
= E
[∫ π
−π
eitZ
k
p1{Zkp=0}
dt
]
+ E
[∫ π
−π
eitZ
k
p1{Zkp,0}
dt
]
= E
[∫ π
−π
1 · 1{Zkp=0}dt
]
+ E [0] = E
[
2π · 1{Zkp=0}
]
= 2π · P(Zkp = 0).
From the above series of equalities, it follows that P(Zkp = 0) =
1
2π
∫ π
−π
ϕk(t; p)dt.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
For completeness, we present all details of the proof, although various steps are anal-
ogous to arguments presented in the proofs of Sandholm et al. (2020, Section 5).
Suppose, first, that the game is generic. Let T be the nonnegative |A∗| × |A∗| matrix
whose element in row a′ and column a is
Ta′a =



2 if action a double S(k) supports action a′ against a∗
1 if action a single S(k) supports action a′ against a∗
0 if action a does not S(k) support action a′ against a∗
We will now compute the Jacobian of the k-payoff sampling dynamic (2.2) in the (monomor-
phic population state corresponding to the) strict symmetric equilibrium action a∗.Suppose
that the frequency αa∗ of action a∗ in the population is 1− ǫ, where ǫ > 0 is a small number.
Denote by α∗ ≡ α|A∗ the frequencies of the actions in the set A∗, that is, α∗a = αa for all a ∈ A
∗.
Clearly,
∑
a∈A∗ α
∗
a = ǫ, which implies that the Euclidean norm of α
∗ is of order ǫ, that is,
|α∗| =
(∑
a∈A∗ α
∗2
a
) 1
2 = O(ǫ).
The probability that a non-equilibrium action a′ ∈ A∗ yields the best payoff is roughly
equal to the probability that it yields a higher payoff than the strict symmetric equilibrium
action a∗ does when both actions are tested k times in the population state α. When a′ ∈ A∗
is tested k times, with a very high probability (of (1− ǫ)k(n−1)) it encounters the equilibrium
action a∗ each time. The probability that a∗ is encountered k − 2 or fewer times is of order
ǫ2 or higher, and these higher-order terms can be neglected for stability analysis. Action
a′ yields a higher payoff than a∗ does in the following two cases:
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Case 1: When a′ is tested, one of the k(n− 1) opponents plays a non-equilibrium action
a and the remaining opponents play a∗. Action a′ obtains the highest mean payoff if a
directly S(k) supports it against a∗, that is, u(a′, a, a∗, . . . , a∗) + (k − 1) · u(a′, a∗, . . . , a∗) >
k · u(a∗, a∗, . . . , a∗).
Case 2: When a∗ is tested, one of the k(n − 1) opponents plays a′ and the others play
a∗. Action a′ obtains the maximal mean payoff if a S(k) supports it by spoiling a∗, that is,
k·u(a′, a∗, . . . , a∗) > u(a∗, a, a∗, . . . , a∗)+(k−1)·u(a∗, . . . , a∗) and u(a′, a∗, . . . , a∗) > u(b, a∗, . . . , a∗)
for all b < {a′, a∗}.
The probability that action a′ yields the best payoff is therefore given by
wa′,k(α) = k(n − 1)
∑
a∈A∗
Ta′aαa +O(|α
∗|2),(A.2)
and the k-payoff sampling dynamic (2.2) can be written as
α̇a′ = wa′,k(α) − αa′ = k(n − 1)
∑
a∈A∗
Ta′aαa − αa′ +O(|α
∗|2).
In matrix notation,
(A.3) α̇∗ = f (α∗) ≡ (k(n − 1)T − I)α∗ +O(|α∗|2),
where I is the |A∗| × |A∗| identity matrix and O(|α∗|2) here is an |A∗|-dimensional vector
with elements of order |α∗|2 or higher. Let J denote the Jacobian matrix of f evaluated at
the origin:
J =
∂ f (α∗)
∂α∗
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
α∗=(0, 0, . . . , 0)
︸       ︷︷       ︸
|A∗ | zeros
= k(n − 1)T − I.
The asymptotic stability of the system (A.3) can be analyzed by examining the eigenvalues
of the Jacobian matrix J.
A sufficient condition for a∗ to be S(k) asymptotically stable is that all the eigenvalues
of J have negative real parts (see, e.g., Sandholm, 2010, Corollary 8.C.2). A sufficient
condition for it not to be S(k) asymptotically stable is that at least one of the eigenvalues
has a positive real part. The first condition holds, in particular, if the only eigenvalue of T
is zero, in other words, if the spectral radius ρ of that matrix is 0, as this condition means
that the only eigenvalue of J is −1. The second condition holds if ρ ≥ 1. This is because the
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spectral radius of a nonnegative matrix is an eigenvalue with a nonnegative eigenvector
(Horn and Johnson, 1985, Theorem 8.3.1), and so ρ ≥ 1 implies that J has the eigenvalue
k(n − 1)ρ − 1 ≥ 2 · 1 − 1 > 0, with a corresponding nonnegative eigenvector. It therefore
suffices to show that ρ = 0 holds if condition I in the theorem holds and ρ ≥ 1 holds if
the condition does not hold. Observe that conditions I and I’ can be rephrased as follows:
every principal submatrix of T has a row or column, respectively, where all entries are
zero. Therefore, to complete the proof of the theorem, it remains only to establish the
following fact (which in particular proves the equivalence of I and I’).
Fact 2. Let M be a square matrix of nonnegative integers, and let ρ be its spectral radius. If every
principal submatrix of M has a row of zeros, then ρ = 0. Otherwise, ρ ≥ 1. The same is true when
we replace “row” by “column.”
Proof of Fact 2. Suppose that ρ > 0. Let v be a corresponding nonnegative right eigenvector.
Since (Mv)i = ρvi > 0 for every index i with vi > 0, the set α of all such indices defines
a principal submatrix M′ (obtained from M by deleting all rows and all columns with
indices not in α) with the property that every row includes at least one nonzero entry.
Conversely, suppose that M has a principal submatrix M′, defined by some set of
indices α, with the above property. Let v be a column vector of 0’s and 1’s where an entry
is 1 if and only if its index lies in α. It is easy to see that Mv ≥ v. This vector inequality
implies that ρ ≥ 1 (Horn and Johnson, 1985, Theorem 8.3.2).
The proof for “column” is obtained by replacing M by its transpose.
We now drop the assumption that the game is generic. This change means that cases 1
and 2 need to be extended by replacing the respective strict inequalities with weak ones.
When a weak inequality in case 1 or 2 holds as equality, the probability of moving to action
a′ depends on the tie-breaking rule. Adding these probabilities to Ta′a, for all a
′, a ∈ A∗,
defines a new matrix T̄ ≥ T, which replaces T in (A.3). If the probabilities were replaced
by 1’s, the result would be a matrix ¯̄T ≥ T̄, where all entries are integers. In view of Fact
2, conditions II and II’ are both equivalent to the condition that the spectral radius of ¯̄T is
0. That condition implies that the spectral radius of T̄ is also 0, which implies that a∗ is
S(k) asymptotically stable. If condition I or I’ does not hold, then the spectral radius of T
is 1 or greater. The same is then true for T̄, which implies that a∗ is not S(k) asymptotically
stable.
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Let T be the |A∗| × |A∗|matrix defined exactly as in the proof of Theorem 2, and denote
by α∗ ≡ α|A∗ the vector of dimension
∑n
i=1 (|Ai| − 1) whose components are the frequencies
of the actions in the set A∗ (that is, the players’ non-equilibrium actions). By arguments
similar to those employed in that proof, if the game is generic, then the Jacobian J of the
k-payoff sampling dynamic (5.1) is given by J = kT − I, so that
α̇∗ = (kT − I)α∗ +O(|α∗|2).
The rest of the proof, including the treatment of the non-generic case, is essentially the
same as for Theorem 2.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2: Global Stability for k ∈ {2, 3}
In this subsection, we characterize the S(2) and S(3) globally asymptotically stable
equilibria explicitly for all parameter configurations g, l in the prisoner’s dilemma.
S(2) analysis: In Theorem 1 we solved the case g, l < 1.Here, we consider the remaining
three cases. Recall that, when testing each action twice, we have:
When a player samples c she



gets 2 with probability p2
gets 1 − l with probability 2p(1 − p)
gets − 2l with probability (1 − p)2
When a player samples d she



gets 2(1 + g) with probability p2
gets 1 + g with probability 2p(1 − p)
gets 0 with probability (1 − p)2
Case I: l < 1 < g. Action c has a higher mean payoff iff the c-sample includes at least
one cooperation and the d-sample does not include any cooperation. Thus, the 2-payoff
sampling dynamic in this case is given by
ṗ = p2(1 − p)2 + 2p(1 − p)(1 − p)2 − p = (1 − p)2(p2 + 2p(1 − p)) − p
= (1 − p)2(1 − (1 − p)2) − p = (1 − p)2 − (1 − p)4 − p.
The rest points of the above dynamic are 0 and 0.245. It is straightforward to verify that 0
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is unstable and that 0.245 is globally stable.
Case II: g < 1 < l. Action c has a higher mean payoff iff the c-sample includes two
cooperations, while the d-sample includes at most one cooperation. The 2-payoff sampling
dynamic in this case is given by ṗ = p2(1 − p2) − p. The unique rest point is 0, which is
globally stable.
Case III: g, l > 1. Action c has a higher mean payoff iff the c-sample includes two
cooperations, while the d-sample does not include any cooperation. The 2-payoff sampling
dynamic in this case is given by ṗ = p2(1 − p)2 − p. As in the previous case, the unique rest
point is 0,which is globally stable.
S(3) analysis: In Theorem 1 we solved the case g, l < 1
2
.Here, we consider the remaining
cases. Recall that, when testing each action thrice, we have:
When a player samples c she



gets 3 with probability p3
gets 2 − l with probability 3p2(1 − p)
gets 1 − 2l with probability 3p(1 − p)2
gets − 2l with probability (1 − p)3
When a player samples d she



gets 3(1 + g) with probability p3
gets 2(1 + g) with probability 3p2(1 − p)
gets 1 + g with probability 3p(1 − p)2
gets 0 with probability (1 − p)3
Case I: l < 1
2
, 1
2
< g < 2, and g+ l < 1.Action c has a higher mean payoff iff, when the c-
sample includes at least two cooperations, the d-sample includes at most one cooperation,
or when the c-sample includes exactly one cooperation, the d-sample does not include any
cooperation. Thus, the 3-payoff sampling dynamic in this case is given by
ṗ = p3(3p(1 − p)2 + (1 − p)3) + 3p2(1 − p)(3p(1 − p)2 + (1 − p)3) + 3p(1 − p)2(1 − p)3 − p
= p2(1 − p)2(3 − 2p)(1 + 2p) + 3p(1 − p)5 − p.
The rest points of the above dynamic are 0 and 0.323. It is straightforward to verify that 0
is unstable and that 0.323 is globally stable.
Case II: l < 1
2
, 1
2
< g < 2, and g + l > 1. Action c has a higher mean payoff iff, when the
c-sample includes three cooperations, the d-sample includes at most one cooperation, or
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when the c-sample includes either one or two cooperations, the d-sample does not include
any cooperation. Thus, the 3-payoff sampling dynamic in this case is given by
ṗ = p3(3p(1 − p)2 + (1 − p)3) + 3p2(1 − p)(1 − p)3 + 3p(1 − p)2(1 − p)3 − p
= p3(1 − p)2(1 + 2p) + 3p(1 − p)4 − p.
The rest points of the above dynamic are 0 and 0.250. It is straightforward to verify that 0
is unstable and that 0.250 is globally stable.
Case III: l < 1
2
, g > 2.Action c has a higher mean payoff iff, when the c-sample includes
at least one cooperation, the d-sample does not include any cooperation. Thus, the 3-payoff
sampling dynamic in this case is given by
ṗ = p3(1 − p)3 + 3p2(1 − p)(1 − p)3 + 3p(1 − p)2(1 − p)3 − p
= (1 − (1 − p)3)(1 − p)3 − p = (1 − p)3 − (1 − p)6 − p.
The rest points of the above dynamic are 0 and 0.245. It is straightforward to verify that 0
is unstable and that 0.245 is globally stable.
Case IV: 1
2
< l < 2, g < 1
2
and g + l < 1. Action c has a higher mean payoff iff, when the
c-sample includes three cooperations, the d-sample includes at most two cooperations, or
when the c-sample includes exactly two cooperations, the d-sample includes at most one
cooperation. Thus, the 3-payoff sampling dynamic in this case is given by
ṗ = p3(1 − p3) + 3p2(1 − p)(3p(1 − p)2) + (1 − p)3) − p
= p3(1 − p3) + 3p2(1 − p)3(1 + 2p) − p.
The unique rest point is 0,which is globally stable.
Case V: 1
2
< l < 2, g < 1
2
, and g + l > 1. Action c has a higher mean payoff iff, when the
c-sample includes three cooperations, the d-sample includes at most two cooperations, or
when the c-sample includes exactly two cooperations, the d-sample does not include any
cooperation. Thus, the 3-payoff sampling dynamic in this case is given by
ṗ = p3(1 − p3) + 3p2(1 − p)(1 − p)3 − p = p3(1 − p3) + 3p2(1 − p)4 − p.
The unique rest point is 0,which is globally stable.
Case VI: 1
2
< l < 2, 1
2
< g < 2. Action c has a higher mean payoff if, when the c-sample
includes three cooperations, the d-sample includes at most one cooperation, or when the c-
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sample includes exactly two cooperations, the d-sample does not include any cooperation.
Thus, the 3-payoff sampling dynamic in this case is given by
ṗ = p3(3p(1 − p)2 + (1 − p)3) + 3p2(1 − p)(1 − p)3 − p
= p3(1 − p)2(1 + 2p) + 3p2(1 − p)4 − p.
The unique rest point is 0,which is globally stable.
Case VII: 1
2
< l < 2, g > 2. Action c has a higher mean payoff iff, when the c-sample
includes at least two cooperations, the d-sample does not include any cooperation. Thus,
the 3-payoff sampling dynamic in this case is given by
ṗ = p3(1 − p)3 + 3p2(1 − p)(1 − p)3 − p = p2(1 − p)3(3 − 2p) − p.
The unique rest point is 0,which is globally stable.
Case VIII: l > 2, g < 1
2
. Action c has a higher mean payoff iff, when the c-sample
includes three cooperations, the d-sample includes at most two cooperations. Thus, the
3-payoff sampling dynamic in this case is given by ṗ = p3(1 − p3) − p. The unique rest point
is 0,which is globally stable.
Case IX: l > 2, 1
2
< g < 2. Action c has a higher mean payoff iff, when the c-sample
includes three cooperations, the d-sample includes at most one cooperation. Thus, the
3-payoff sampling dynamic in this case is given by
ṗ = p3(3p(1 − p)2 + (1 − p)3) − p = p3(1 − p)2(1 + 2p) − p.
The unique rest point is 0,which is globally stable.
Case X: l > 2, g > 2. Action c has a higher mean payoff iff, when the c-sample includes
three cooperations, the d-sample does not include any cooperation. Thus, the 3-payoff
sampling dynamic in this case is given by ṗ = p3(1−p)3−p. The unique rest point is 0,which
is globally stable.
A.7 Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose that action a∗ is not S(k) asymptotically stable under the one-population
dynamics, and so there is a subset A′ ⊆ A\{a∗} such that all actions in A′ are supported
against a∗ by actions in A′. Let Ā′ = ˙
⋃n
i=1A
′ be the disjoint union of n copies of A′. It follows
immediately from Definitions 5 and 7 and the symmetry of the game that all actions in Ā′
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Figure 2: Values of g and l in the 29 Experiments Summarized in Mengel (2018, Table A.3)
are supported by actions in Ā′ against ā∗ ≡ (a∗, a∗, . . . , a∗). Therefore, the strategy profile
ā∗ is not S(k) asymptotically stable under the n-population dynamics.
Conversely, suppose that the last conclusion holds, so that there is a subset A′ ⊆ A∗ ≡
˙⋃n
i=1(A\{a
∗}) such that all actions in A′ are supported by actions in A′ against ā∗. Let
Ā′ = {a ∈ A | there is some player i and a corresponding action ai ∈ A
′ with a = ai} be the
set of all actions that are included in A′ for at least one player. It is easy to see that
all actions in Ā′ are supported against a∗ by actions in Ā′, and so action a∗ is not S(k)
asymptotically stable under the one-population dynamics.
B. Values of g and l in Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiments
Figure 2 shows the values of g and l in the 29 experiments of the one-shot prisoner’s
dilemma (taken from 16 papers) as summarized in the meta-study of Mengel (2018, Table
A.3). The figure shows that most of these experiments satisfy the condition for global
stability of partial cooperation for k = 2 (namely, l < 1), and quite a few of them also
satisfy the condition for k = 3 (l < 0.5).
–30–
References
Burton-Chellew, M. N., El Mouden, C., and West, S. A. (2017). Social learning and the
demise of costly cooperation in humans. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences, 284:20170067.
Cárdenas, J., Mantilla, C., and Sethi, R. (2015). Stable sampling equilibrium in common
pool resource games. Games, 6(3):299–317.
Chmura, T. and Güth, W. (2011). The minority of three-game: An experimental and
theoretical analysis. Games, 2(3):333–354.
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3):817–868.
Heller, Y. and Mohlin, E. (2018). Social learning and the shadow of the past. Journal of
Economic Theory, 177:426–460.
Horn, R. A. and Johnson, C. R. (1985). Matrix Analysis. Cambridge University Press.
Kosfeld, M., Droste, E., and Voorneveld, M. (2002). A myopic adjustment process leading
to best-reply matching. Games and Economic Behavior, 40(2):270–298.
Kreindler, G. E. and Young, H. P. (2013). Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium
selection. Games and Economic Behavior, 80:39–67.
Mantilla, C., Sethi, R., and Cárdenas, J. C. (2018). Efficiency and stability of sampling
equilibrium in public goods games. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 22(2):355–370.
McKelvey, R. D. and Palfrey, T. R. (1995). Quantal response equilibria for normal form
games. Games and economic behavior, 10(1):6–38.
Mengel, F. (2018). Risk and temptation: A meta-study on prisoner’s dilemma games. The
Economic Journal, 128(616):3182–3209.
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